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JURISDICTION IN LABOR CONTROVERSIES: NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. THE COURTS
The question of who has jurisdiction over litigation in labor relations
has been before the United States Supreme Court many times during
the past several years. Judges, law school professors, and labor lawyers are
hesitant when asked about jurisdiction because tomorrow's advance sheets
may prove them wrong. This Comment examines the current pronouncements
of the United States Supreme Court on the question of jurisdiction in section
3011 suits and related matters. Recent decisions will be synthesized in an at-
tempt to formulate general rules.
The starting point and principal reference point for this analysis will
be the recent case of Smith v. Evening News Ass'n.2 This was a suit by a
union member in his own right and on behalf of forty-nine other employees
similarly aggrieved. The action was brought in a Michigan state court on
the theory of breach of contract on the part of the employer. The plaintiff
alleged that the employer had committed the breach by refusing to permit
plaintiff to work and allowing nonunion employees to come to work and
receive full wages even though no work was available. The Michigan court
refused to take jurisdiction. It was of the view that since an unfair labor
practice3 was involved, the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction
pre-empted that of the court.4 On appeal to the Supreme Court Mr. Justice
White, speaking for the majority, refused to apply the pre-emption principle
here although "the alleged conduct of the employer, not only arguably, but
concededly, is an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board." 5 The Court held that the NLRB was not the ex-
clusive forum to decide controversies which involved a breach of a collective
bargaining agreement.6
1. "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." Labor Management Rela-
tions Act § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
2. 83 Sup. Ct. 267 (1962).
3. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization .... ." Labor Management Relations Act § 8(a) (3), 73 Stat.
525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (Supp. 1962).
4. In a footnote Mr. Justice White mentions that although an unfair labor practice
charge could have been filed by the petitioner, that remedy was not commenced within
the six-month limitation period. Supra note 2, at 269 n.5.
5. Id. at 268-69.
6. "The authority of the Board to deal with an unfair labor practice which also
violates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301, but is not exclusive
and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301." Id. at 269.
403
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The theory of pre-emption may have been built on the foundation laid
by the case of Hill v. Florida.7 Although the facts and holding of the case
do not directly concern themselves with the theory, the decision made it
clear that no interference with the legislative policy behind the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act8 would be tolerated.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,9 some years later, formu-
lated the current pre-emption doctrine. In the Garmon case the employer filed
for an injunction against union picketing; he also asked for damages from
the inion. The state courts granted relief to the employer. The United States
Supreme Court reversed. The Court wanted to reserve the task of deciding
labor relations matters for the NLRB in order to avoid areas of "potential
conflict of rules of law, of remedy, and of administration" 10 between state
and federal authorities. Mr. Justice Frankfurter proceeded to lay down a
rule: "When an activity is arguably subject to [the unfair labor practice
provisions] of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to
the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger
of state interference with national policy is to be averted."'"
The Smith case raises a number of questions. Where a collective-
bargaining agreement embodies prohibitions against unfair labor practices,
can the state courts take jurisdiction on a breach of contract theory? Is
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act intended to limit or to extend the forums
available to hear labor controversies? If the state courts assume jurisdiction,
what law should be applied-state or federal? Does an individual have stand-
ing to bring a suit against his union for breach of the collective bargaining
agreement?
These delicate and difficult problems were anticipated in earlier federal
cases. In Textile Workers Union v. Arista Mills Co.,1 2 the court anticipated
and frowned upon a situation where board jurisdiction would be avoided by
inserting a prohibition against unfair labor practices in the contract.' The
7. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
8. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
9. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
10. Id. at 242.
11. Id. at 245. (Emphasis added.)
12. 193 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951).
13. Id. at 533.
We think it clear that parties may not by including a provision against unf- ir labor
practices in a bargaining agreement vest in the courts jurisdiction to deal with
matters which Congress has placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board. Where, however, substantive rights with
respect to such matters as positions or pay are created by bargaining agree-
ments, there is no reason why the courts may not enforce them even though the
breach of contract with regard thereto may constitute also an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of the act.
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breach of contract in the Smith case did amount to an unfair labor practice. 14
In Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co.,15 Judge Wyzanski
wrote a scholarly opinion discussing most of the problems that have crystal-
lized in recent cases. The greater portion of the opinion considers the
various problems which could arise in determining which law should apply-
state or federal. 1 6 This question has since been answered in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills.'7 Lincoln Mills is authority for the proposition that
federal law and not state law is to be applied in section 301 suits. Mr.
Justice Douglas suggested that the federal courts fashion a body of federal
law to govern these controversies. i8 The argument that if state courts are
given jurisdiction over these cases confusing and conflicting views will result
can be answered. Suppose only federal courts hear section 301 cases; there
is a possibility that each circuit will develop a different rule. Anyway, is it
not better to have persons trained in the law-federal or state court judges-
decide these matters than some arbitrators, who are not law trained ?19
It has even been argued that the granting of jurisdiction to the federal
district courts has rendered section 301 unconstitutional.20 However, the
present quarrel is over whether or not state courts have jurisdiction to hear
these cases.
In Garner v. Teamsters Union2 1 an action was brought by trucking-
business operators against the union to enjoin certain picketing on the theory
that the picketing was intended to coerce the employers into violating a
statute by discriminating in hire, tenure, or conditions of employment. The
Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County enjoined the picketing. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed the bill for want of jurisdiction. The
United States Supreme Court held that the controversy in question fell
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB:
14. The conduct violated the Labor Management Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 73
Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (Supp. 1962).
15. 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
16. Id. at 139-40.
17. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
18. Id. at 450-51. "Other courts-the overwhelming number of them-hold that
§ 301(a) is more than jurisdictional-that it authorizes federal courts to fashion a
body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements ....
That is our construction of § 301 (a) .. "
19. See Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76
HARV. L. REV. 532 (1963).
20. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576, 579
(1956). "As we understand appellant's argument, it is that Congress has not prescribed
any federal cause of action to be enforced in a suit under § 301; that the substantive
law to be applied in such a case has its origin in state law; and that, absent diversity
of citizenship, Congress cannot confer upon the federal courts jurisdiction to entertain
such a cause of action calling for the application of state law."
21. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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We conclude that when federal power constitutionally is exerted
for the protection of public or private interests, or both, it becomes
the supreme law of the land and cannot be curtailed, circumvented
or extended by a state procedure merely because it will apply
some doctrine of private right . . . .Of course, Congress, in en-
acting such legislation as we have here, can save alternative or
supplemental state remedies by express terms or by some clear
implication, if it sees fit.
22
It is interesting to note that in Garner the argument was urged upon the
Court that a distinction must be made between cases involving private rights
and those involving public rights, that the issue in the Garner case involved
private rights and therefore should be heard in the state court. The Court
did not accept this distinction, concluding that supplemental remedies would
terminate in conflicts.
In Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.2s an employer sought to enjoin a
union from picketing his plant; he contended the picketing was in restraint
of trade. The circuit court for the city of St. Louis granted the injunction,
and the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed. The United States Supreme
Court considered the fact that the action was dismissed by the NLRB,
which had been of the view that no unfair labor practice had been com-
mitted. The Court concluded that the state court had no jurisdiction to hear
the same controversy, although some additional allegations were pleaded. It
was for the NLRB to decide whether an unfair labor practice had been
committed.2 4 The Court stated as the governing rule that a state court is
not permitted to restrain conduct under its local labor statute which had
been defined as an unfair labor practice by the federal statute.25 This case
seems to support the exclusive competence of the NLRB.
A very interesting issue was raised in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Bd.26 The question was whether the state courts could decide matters in
areas where the NLRB might in its discretion decline jurisdiction. The
Court held that state courts could not act in such situations, even if a
no-man's land of labor controversies would be created thereby.27 The
22. Id. at 500, 501.
23. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
24. It should be noted that the complaint was filed in the state court after a charge
was filed with the Board but before the Board had disposed of the matter.
25. Supra note 23, at 475. "Such was the holding of the Garner case .
The Court pointed out that exclusive primary jurisdiction to pass on the union's
picketing is delegated by the Taft-Hartley Act to the National Labor Relations Board."
26. 353 U.S. 1 (1957). The same question was presented in Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957) and in San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
27. The Board in this case had not ceded its jurisdiction to the state as it could
have done under the Labor Management Relations Act § 10(a), 61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C.
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problem was faced in the Landrum-Griffin Act where an amendment was
adopted to enable state courts to assume jurisdiction in a limited area where
the Board refuses to take jurisdiction.2 8 It has been suggested that the
statute should set forth specifically the situations in which the Board would
not be permitted to decline jurisdiction.
2 9
The pre-emption rule which was severely limited in the Smith case
had not been followed in another set of cases which could be classified as
the local interest cases. Where the state's interest in a case is of paramount,
immediate importance the state courts will be permitted to assume jurisdic-
tion. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.80 was a tort action
by a contractor against a labor union for damages allegedly incurred when
the union's agents threatened and intimidated the contractor's employees
thereby preventing the contractor from continuing with the project. The
state court rendered a judgment for the plaintiff. Even though the conduct
in question amounted to an unfair labor practice, the NLRB did not have
exclusive jurisdiction of the common-law tort. The Court distinguished
Laburnum from Garners' on the basis that there would be no conflict
between state and federal remedies; Congress had not provided a means
for relief from such conduct. "To the extent . . . that Congress has not
prescribed procedure for dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct
already committed, there is no ground for concluding that existing criminal
penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have been eliminated."3 2 Mr.
Justice Douglas dissented in the Laburnum case because he believed that
since the action in question amounted to an unfair labor practice proscribed
by the federal act, the parties should be confined to the remedy provided
for in the act. The dissent reasoned that the administrative agency's remedy
was designed to resolve disputes quickly in order to lessen the friction
caused by protracted court contests. However, it seems that the dissenting
opinion unjustifiably assumes that Congress intended to prevent state courts
§ 160(a) (1947). "[T]he Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any
State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases ...even where
such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce .... "
28. The Board in its discretion, may . . . decline to assert jurisdiction
over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where,
in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce
is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction:
Provided, that the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any
labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards
prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 701, 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C.
§ 164 (Supp. III, 1962).
29. For a good treatment of this point see Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor
Law October Term, 1959, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 902-03 (1960).
30. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
31. Supra note 21.
32. Supra note 30, at 665.
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from applying their traditional remedies. In International Union v. Russell3
suit was brought by a non-union employee against the union and its agents.
Russell contended that the union and its agents maliciously interfered with
him and prevented him by threatening bodily harm and property damage
from entering a struck plant. The Alabama court rendered a judgment for
Russell. In the Supreme Court petitioners tried to escape the Laburnum
ruling by pointing out that the Board was empowered to award Russell back
pay. When Congress afforded a remedy the state court should not assume
jurisdiction. The Court answered this argument, "It is our view that Congress
has not made such a distinction and that it has not, in either case, deprived
a victim of the kind of conduct here involved of common-law rights of ac-
tion for all damages suffered. '3 4 Laburnum and Russell are distinguishable
from the pre-emption cases on the basis that the wrongful conduct alleged
in both cases warranted a sufficient local interest in maintaining public order
to vest jurisdiction in the state courts. At the same time, however, both
decisions evidence that the United States Supreme Court did not subscribe
to the view that federal labor legislation eliminated traditional rights which
were always cognizable in state courts.
In establishing the principle in the Smith3 5 case that the NLRB did not
have exclusive jurisdiction to decide labor controversies over breaches of
collective-bargaining agreements, the United States Supreme Court spelled
out what it had been leading up to in a line of prior cases. Four decisions
handed down in 1962 made the decision in Smith inevitable. Charles Dowd
Box Co. v. Courtney3 6 was a suit to enforce a collective bargaining agree-
ment. The Massachusetts court assumed jurisdiction and entered a money
judgment which complied with the wage provisions of the agreement. One of
the employer's defenses was that state courts had been completely pre-empted
from hearing such cases. The theory of the plaintiff was that section 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Act3 7 did not take away from the state courts their tradi-
tional jurisdictional reach. In affirming the state court's assertion of jurisdic-
tion, Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority, said,
The clear implication of the entire record of the congressional debates
in both 1946 and 1947 is that the purpose of conferring jurisdiction
upon the federal district courts was not to displace, but to supple-
ment, the thoroughly considered jurisdiction of the courts of the
various States over contracts made by labor organizations.
38
33. 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
34. Id. at 641, 642.
35. Supra note 2.
36. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
37. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
38. Supra note 36, at 525.
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The Court distinguished the Garner 3  case. Although unfair labor practices
were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board, the same was not true
concerning breaches of contract. The Court found a legislative intent to
exclude breaches of collective-bargaining agreements from the list of unfair
labor practices.40 The decision admits that conflicting law may result, but
answers this objection by saying that, "To resolve and accommodate such
diversities and conflicts is one of the traditional functions of this Court."'41
In Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co.,42 the Court again broke
away from the pre-emption rule. An employer sued for the damages which
resulted from a strike conducted by a union in breach of the collective-
bargaining contract. The Supreme Court affirmed a state court judgment for
the employer, distinguishing the pre-emption cases. 43 Perhaps the conduct in
Lucas Flour did not constitute an unfair labor practice. In Atkinson v.
Sinclair Refining Co.,44 the employer brought an action against a union and
its officials for breach of a no-strike agreement. The Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice White, held that the union but not union
officials could be held liable. The narrow holding of the case is that the
action was a section 301 suit, properly subject to court jurisdiction. 45 The
fourth case which laid the background for the Smith decision was Retail
Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc.,46 an action by two unions against
an employer for violation of a strike-settlement agreement. The Court had to
decide two important questions in determining whether or not the federal
district court had properly refused to assume jurisdiction. Did the scope of
39. Supra note 21.
40. Supra note 36, at 513.
By contrast, Congress expressly rejected that policy [of granting primary
jurisdiction to the NLRB] with respect to violations of collective bargaining
agreements by rejecting the proposal that such violations be made unfair
labor practices. Instead, Congress deliberately chose to leave the enforcement
of collective agreements "to the usual processes of the law." (Emphasis added.)
41. Id. at 514.
42. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
43. Since this was a suit for violation of a collective bargaining contract
within the purview of § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, the pre-emptive doctrine of cases such as San Diego Building Trades
Council, etc. v. Garmon . . . based upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board, is not relevant.
Id. at 101, n.9.
44. 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
45. Proof of the allegations of Count II in its present form would inevitably
prove a violation of the no-strike clause by the union itself. Count II [alle-
gations against individual union officials], like Count I, is thus a suit based
on the union's breach of its collective bargaining contract with the employer, and
therefore comes within § 301(a). When a union breach of contract is alleged,
that the plaintiff seeks to hold the agents liable instead of the principal does
not bring the action outside the scope of § 301.
Id. at 247.
46. 369 U.S. 17 (1962).
19631
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"contracts" in section 301 encompass the agreement in question, which could
not be termed a collective-bargaining agreement? Secondly, would the juris-
diction of the federal courts under section 301 be affected by the fact that the
labor organizations were not certified as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representatives of the employees? The Court construed the terms of the
statute broadly and answered the first question presented yes and the second
no.
These cases represent the background of the Smith decision. The Su-
preme Court held in that case that section 301 was not a limiting provision.
The Court accepted the reasoning of prior cases that the purpose of section 301
was only to provide another forum in case the state procedure for enforcing
labor contracts was too cumbersome.47 It was argued that the Garmon pre-
emption rule should apply to eliminate state-court jurisdiction because this
was an action by an employee, not a labor organization, to recover back
wages in the form of damages. Therefore, section 301 should not apply.
The respondent-employer relied for this position on Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.48 This case has been cited for the
proposition that section 301 did not empower the courts to assume juris-
diction over rights which are "uniquely personal" arising "from separate
hiring contracts between the employer and the employee. '49 The majority
in Westinghouse held that section 301 did not authorize a union to recover
back wages for its members in a federal court. 50 The petitioner in the Smith
case worked out an argument showing that the right pursued by Smith was
not uniquely personal; and the Court considered its prior decisions had buried
the holding in Westinghouse.51 Three of the Justices in the Westinghouse
majority reached their conclusion because of a belief that section 301 was
merely procedural in nature. The same Justices would have decided other-
wise if section 301 had been viewed as substantive.
52 Lincoln Mills53 subse-
quently decided that section 301 had substantive content.
Two cases again raised the pre-emption issue last June, Local 100, Ass'n
of Journeymen v. Borden54 and Local 207, Intl Ass'n of Iron Workers Union
47. Supra note 6.
48. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
49. Id. at 460-61.
50. "Nowhere in the legislative history did Congress discuss or show any recogni-
tion of the type of suit involved here, in which the union is suing on behalf of employees
for accrued wages. Therefore, we conclude that Congress did not confer on the federal
courts jurisdiction over a suit such as this one." Id. at 461.
51. "[Slubsequent decisions here have removed the underpinnings of Westinghouse
and its holding is no longer authoritative as a precedent." Supra note 2, at 269.
52. Supra note 48, at 442.
53. Supra note 17.
54. 83 Sup. Ct. 1423 (1963).
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v. Perko.55 These were actions brought by individual union members against
their unions. Since Justices Douglas and Clark dissented in both cases because
they believed that a prior decision had not been fairly distinguished, an
examination of that decision, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales,56 is
in order. Gonzales was brought in the state courts of California. Alleging
wrongful expulsion from the union, plaintiff sought reinstatement and dam-
ages on a breach of contract theory. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that
the lower court had jurisdiction to award damages in the form of back
wages and also for mental and physical suffering although the NLRB
could have afforded partial relief. The action was not under section 301
because the employer was not a party to the proceedings. Although wrongful
expulsion in some situations would amount to an unfair labor practice,57 the
Court concluded that the remedy of reinstatement should be preserved as
an aspect of traditional state-court jurisdiction.58 This case gave the court
trouble in Borden and Perko. In the Borden59 case an employee brought
suit in the state courts of Texas because of his union's wrongful refusal
to refer him to an employer who requested the employee. The state court
granted relief to the union member. The Supreme Court reversed on the
basis that there was no compelling state interest involved, necessary to avoid
the application of the Garmon pre-emption rule. The Gonzales case was dis-
tinguished, because purely internal union matters were involved in that
case, principally, reinstatement in the union, a remedy which the Board could
not administer.6" Since the conduct involved in Borden was arguably subject
to Board jurisdiction, that jurisdiction was exclusive, said the court. In the
55. 83 Sup. Ct. 1429 (1963).
56. 356 U.S. 617 (1957).
57. (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(2) . . . to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership
in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than
his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required
as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
Labor Management Relations Act § 8(b) (2), 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2)
(1947).
58. "[T]o preclude a state court from exerting its traditional jurisdiction to
determine and enforce the rights of union membership would in many cases leave an
unjustly ousted member without remedy for the restoration of his important union
rights." Supra note 56, at 620.
It should also be pointed out that the Supreme Court believed that once a state
court assumed jurisdiction of a case it could grant full relief, notwithstanding that the
NLRB could have granted partial relief.
59. Supra note 54.
60. "The suit involved here was focused principally . . . on the union's actions
with respect to Borden's efforts to obtain employment. No specific equitable relief was
sought directed to Borden's status in the union. . . ." Id. at 1427.
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Perko6 case an individual union member brought an action in an Ohio court
against the union and certain union officials on the theory that defendants
had unlawfully conspired to prevent him from enjoying his rights as a fore-
man. The trial court dismissed the action. The Supreme Court of Ohio
reversed and remanded the case for trial. The jury returned a verdict for
Perko in the sum of $25,000. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. The
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan as in Borden, reversed
on the same reasoning applied in that case.6 2 The conduct involved in both
cases was at least "arguably" subject to Board jurisdiction as an unfair labor
practice." What would the result have been if in both cases the union
members had sued on the theory that they had been deprived of rights as
union members, seeking relief in the nature of a declaration of their rights
and restoration of their positions in the union? Perhaps skillful pleading will
vest jurisdiction in the state courts in many of these cases. Although the
grounds for distinguishing these last two cases from Gonzales may be questioned,
the distinction is clear, and the cases may be reconciled. It seems that if the
union member requests a remedy which the Board is powerless to administer,
the state courts may exercise their traditional powers and will decide all of
the issues presented, including some in which the Board is generally the
exclusive forum. This is merely an application of the general rule that once
equity assumes jurisdiction of a case, it will decide all questions presented.
Under the Smith6 4 case state courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide
section 301 breach of contract cases. The Garmon
6 5 pre-emption rule will
still vest exclusive jurisdiction in the NLRB in cases which involve unfair
labor practices if the Board is capable of administering a full and complete
remedy. Under the Gonzales"6 holding a state court has jurisdiction when
an individual union member brings an action against his union on questions
dealing with purely internal union matters or, apparently, when his claim
calls for a remedy that the Board is unable to order. The trend seems to be
to permit state-court jurisdiction wherever courts can give a more adequate
remedy than the Board.
ANTHONY P. MOSES
61. Supra note 55.
62. "As in Borden, the crux of the action here concerned alleged interference
with the Plaintiff's existing or prospective employment relations and was not directed
to internal union matters." Id. at 1431.
63. See Labor Management Relations Act § 8(b) (2), 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (2) (1947).
64. Supra note 2.
65. Supra note 9.
66. Supra note 56.
